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information on
the Polish-East German border, including security measures and border
police organizations on both sides.

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Description

A. Boundary Lines. (See Annex A.)

1. The border between East Germany and Poland begins in the north at the Baltic Sea between Ahlbeck, East Germany, and Swinoujscie (Swinemuende), Poland, and runs generally south in a fairly direct line to the East German town of Zittau on the Czechoslovakian border. Although basically a land boundary, it passes at intervals through bodies of water.
2. The border line has the following sectors:
 - a. From the Baltic, the border runs south for a relatively short distance over level terrain and then crosses Szczecin Bay, a fresh water lake. The western part of this lake, the Kleiner Haff, belongs to East Germany; the larger, eastern part, the Grosser Haff, with its entry to Swinoujscie (called in Polish Piastowski Kanal, in German Kaiserfahrt), belongs to Poland. The water boundary is indicated by buoys with the appropriate city insignia.
 - b. From the southern edge of the Haff, the border runs in a southerly direction through the Neuwarper See (Polish Nowowarpieńskie Jezioro) and then is formed by the Beeck, a stream which flows from the Gross Müntzelburger See (Wielkie Jezioro Mysliborskie) into the Neuwarper See.
 - c. South of the Gross Müntzelburger See, the border returns to land, running through woods and meadows.
 - d. Further south, the border continues on land, except where it crosses the Stolzenburg (Stolec) and Blanken Lakes.
 - e. The border reaches the Oder River just below the village of Gartz in East Germany. The center of the Oder forms the boundary from there through Frankfurt an der Oder; above, it is the center of the Neisse River through Görlitz to Zittau, which is at an angle where the boundaries of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia come together.

B. Border Security Measures. (See Annex B.)

1. The border from the Baltic to Zittau was secured by border guards, on the German side members of the East German Border Police (Grenzberichtschaft), on the Polish side soldiers of the Polish Frontier Defense Troops (WOP - Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza).
2. Both Germans and Poles employed a series of security measures on the border. These consisted, in addition to patrols, of:
 - a. On the German side:
 - (1) Border stakes marked with numbers and city insignia.
 - (2) Observation towers and observation posts in trees.
 - (3) Barriers on roads and railroads leading to the border.
 - (4) Technical devices e.g. acoustic signals and rockets connected to tripwires.

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b. On the Polish side:

- (1) Border stakes marked with numbers and city insignia.
- (2) Wire fences of various heights.
- (3) Observation towers and observation posts in trees.
- (4) Barriers on roads and railroads leading to the border.
- (5) A plowed control strip, usually 10 meters wide.
- (6) Various technical devices. tripwires connected to rockets, lights, etc.

3. Equipment of the troops on both sides consisted of weapons, field glasses (usually former military equipment), and special clothing for various seasons. Both sides used vehicles of various sorts, including motorcycles, with or without sidecars, and, for the river sectors, boats. The German boats were built at the yacht works in East Berlin and were much faster than the Polish, which were always old craft purchased from fishermen. Patrol craft on the Oder normally traveled at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. Both sides had both guard and tracking dogs.
4. A completely functional telephone network was maintained on both sides of the border in each company area; no connection was permitted with units outside the area. The network consisted of a simple military field cable, running along the border at a distance of about 200 meters from it. The cable was secured to trees, with a connection to each observation tower and plugs attached to the trees at intervals of about 300 meters. Each sentry carried a telephone head-set, so that he could telephone from whatever point he had reached. The network on the German side was established by Wollweber when he was Minister of State Security and covered all the East German borders.
5. Both Polish and East German border guards used tripwires connected to rockets and acoustical devices. Tripwires were usually placed parallel to the border and 20 to 100 meters back from it, depending on the terrain.
 - a. Rockets were used at night primarily in wooded areas where visibility, for example from observation towers, was limited. Hidden tripwires were connected directly with the rocket launchers; the wire was about as thick as horse hair and ran 50 to 100 meters between launchers. It was not uncommon to have acoustical devices, such as pieces of iron, suspended from the tripwire, which clanged when the wire was touched. The East German rocket launchers were believed better than the Polish, but the Polish tripwires connected to light poles were very good, turning on strong lights and illuminating the whole area where the wire was hit. (See Annex C.)
 - b. The East Germans also had tripwires connected to concealed earth observation bunkers; there were about six such bunkers on the Polish border. When touched, the wire triggered a red light in the bunker. Two border guards manned each bunker about six to eight hours a day.
 - c. Different colors were used to indicate whether the flares were sent up on the East German or Polish side. The colors used for a given month were coordinated at a monthly meeting. Special colors and combinations were used to indicate the detection of a crosser, the need for an officer, the need for an NCO, and an emergency.

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6. Before the fifteenth of each month, usually about the twelfth, Polish and East German border guard representatives at regimental level held a meeting to coordinate security measures for the coming month. At this time they arranged the deployment of personnel and the color of signal flares and designated sensitive border areas. If the Poles were short of men in a particular sector, the East Germans would cover it, and vice versa.

East German Border Security (between East Germany and Poland)

A. Border Sectors. (See Annex D.)

The northern part of the border on the German side was divided into areas under two border police commands, the Greifswald Border Police Regiment and the Loecknitz Border Police Regiment. The Greifswald Regiment was subordinate to the Rostock Brigade, which was responsible for the northern water frontier. Greifswald was responsible for the area from the Baltic to the Kalkbergen (Chalk Mountains), north of Rieth Island (Werder). The area south to Zittau was under the Frankfurt/Oder Brigade, which was broken down into the Loecknitz and Goerlitz Grenzbereitschaften (Regiment). (The land border covered by the Loecknitz Regiment was only about 50 kilometers in length, the rest being water border.) The border and its defenses included the following sectors:

1. From the Baltic to the village of Caminke on the Haff, controlled by a border police company of the Greifswald regiment, at Ahlbeck. This was primarily a land border, running from the Haff about three kilometers south over level terrain through an area that was all meadows and then further south through an extensively wooded area. The land border was equipped with sentry posts, and the police company had about four dogs. No alarm devices were known to exist there. The entire Baltic beach area was guarded. Both the Poles and the Germans considered the security of this area important.

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2. From Caminke through the Haff and the Neuwarper See, controlled by a border police company of the Greifswald Regiment. The company was small because it was responsible only for guarding the Haff and the adjacent lake and left the land border to adjacent companies. Boats, usually manned by three policemen, were used; the men had one machine pistol per boat. Technical aids were less important than guards. The entire Haff was observed by day from both observation towers and boats.
3. From the Kalkenbergen through the Gross Muetzelburger See, controlled by a company of the Loecknitz Border Police Regiment, with headquarters at Rieth.
 - a. The village of Rieth had about 400 inhabitants. About 50 were owners of large fishing businesses, about 100 of small fishing businesses; there was a small percentage of independent craftsmen; the rest of the community were farmers. The SED was one of the smallest political parties in the town; most citizens belonged to the NPDP. The attitude of the population toward the East German

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government was not very good, because fishermen had no opportunity to fish their old waters, in many cases inherited from their ancestors. When an attempt was made to force them to construct communal landings, they refused, saying they would rather stop fishing. The one tavern in the village, the Blauer See, was run by a woman [redacted]

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Relations between the population and the border police were generally poor because the police fined the fishermen for the slightest offense. The Gross Muetzelburger See was managed by a master fisherman, Werner Hellermann [redacted]

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- b. The border in this area was difficult to observe; from the Neuwarper See it ran for a short distance through a forest, then across open meadow land. The border there was the Beeck, a stream about two meters wide. About one kilometer from the Neuwarper See an unused railroad track, raised somewhat above the surrounding terrain, crossed the border. There were no definite roads. A road was once constructed south from the Muetzelburger See to the town of Mysliborz (Muetzelburg), on the Polish side; it was still called Holzstrasse but could not be traveled because it had greatly deteriorated.
- c. A sentry post, occupied day and night, was maintained on both the abandoned railroad and the Holzstrasse. There were other individual observation posts in towers and trees along the border. These were not always all occupied; they were manned under assignments from the company staff according to the points considered critical at the moment because of the number and location of border crossers. At least three sentry posts were maintained on the border by day and four at night; this arrangement was not expected to change before 1960.
- d. Patrols were sent through the area during each 24-hour period. These, and the constant changes of sentry posts, would give an observer the impression that the area contained a large number of border police. Patrols and observation posts were both active within a distance of about 800 meters from the border.
- e. Acoustical and visual signal devices were used. The wires that set off the signal devices ran for a distance of some 40 meters inland from the border; with a little attention, they could be discovered.

4. From the south end of the Gross Muetzelburger See south to the village of Glasshuette, controlled by a company of the Loecknitz Regiment, with headquarters at Hintersee.

- a. The village of Hintersee had about 800 residents, of whom about 200 were farmers. The SED was the strongest political party but carried on no political activity; since the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend) (Free German Youth) leaders provided no activities, most of the membership had gone to the "Young People's Community." The other parties, CDU, NDP, and NDPD, were very small and had no influence. The community had a bicycle club, which has been in existence since about 1938; although its members were not political party members, they actively opposed the East German regime. There had been several investigations by the State Security Service, the Intelligence Service of the border police, and the criminal police, but nothing had

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been proved against any of the members.

- b. Most of this part of the border ran through a large forest, with only occasional meadows. A fence, two and a half meters high, and Y-shaped, ran along the Polish side of the border. Security on the German side was handled by patrols and observation posts in towers and trees and on the ground. There were four posts, each manned day and night by two sentries, but sentries were often drunk or asleep. A road ran from the village of Hintersee toward Poland, but there was no traffic on it. It passed the Border Police headquarters and was closed by a barrier and trench at the border, with a sentry permanently on guard.
- c. Visual and acoustic signal and alarm devices were used. The tripwires extended from the fence a distance of about 40 meters; they could be seen by close inspection.
- d. There was much poaching in this area, since most of the border police were corrupt and could be bribed.

5. From near the village of Hintersee to about 500 meters beyond the Pam-power See, controlled by a border police company of the Loecknitz Regiment with headquarters at Pampow.

- a. The village had about 500 residents, of whom the majority worked on farms. The SED was the strongest party but carried on little political activity. Most of the young people belonged to the FDJ, which had a number of assistance groups that, when needed, supported the border police in searching for illegal border crossers. Relations between the population and the border police were generally good.
- b. Half of the border ran through woods, the rest through meadows; near the village of Stolzenburg, it ran through the Stolzenburger See. The lake was leased by a fisherman from the village of Blankensee and was not fished on the Polish side. A destroyed railroad line, south of the Stolzenburger See, crossed the border into Poland; the right-of-way was easily observable from any point in the vicinity. A road running south to Daber was in use on the Polish side.
- c. The border was guarded by observation posts in the trees and in towers; by ground observation and listening posts; and by patrols.
- d. Visual and acoustic alarm devices were used, the tripwires running some 40 meters inland from the fence. Between 1952 and 1958, these devices were not in very good condition; sometimes the wires were broken or there were no flares in the visual alarm devices.

6. From about 500 meters south of the Pam-power See to an area near Daber, Poland, controlled by a company of the Loecknitz Regiment, with headquarters at Blankensee.

- a. The village had about 500 inhabitants, mostly farmers; a collective farm there was one of the poorest in Pasewalk Kreis. The SED was the strongest party in the village but almost completely inactive politically; some members joined other organizations. Among these were CDU, relatively strong; DBD, relatively weak; NDP, relatively

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weak; NDPD, relatively strong; FDJ, relatively strong; and the DSF, FDGB, and DPF. The minister in the community was expert at bringing young people into the church; a number of FDJ members joined the "Young People's Community." During the 1958 elections, however, the minister's appeal to the citizens to refrain from voting was disregarded by the majority.

- b. The border in this area was for the most part visible, at least in the southern area, where it ran mostly through a sandy region; the northern part ran through a large forest. There was a road, passable almost to the border on the German side, but blocked at the border, where it had been dug up by the border police. A path lying north of the road, also crossing the border, had a trench dug across it at the border line.
- c. The border in this area was guarded by ground observation posts, tower observation posts, and patrols, which continually changed their routes.
- d. Visual and acoustic alarm devices were used, but only in the northern part of this sector. Dogs were used by the border police, in a varying pattern of patrols; the company had four dogs.

7. From near Daber, Poland, to the border check point on the railroad at Grambow, controlled by a company of border police of the Loecknitz Regiment with headquarters at Neu Lienken. The railroad line was supposed to be the sector boundary, but changes were constantly made; one month the line was guarded by the Neu Lienken company, the next by the adjacent company at Ladenthin.

- a. The village of Neu Lienken had only about 30 residents, almost all farmers or members of the border police. There was little political activity. Relations with the border police were good. Some residents in the town, the farmers from their fields, and residents along the road could see the border. When they observed anything suspicious, they reported it to the border police.
- b. In the southern part of the sector, the border, which was quite easily visible, ran through a wooded area as far as the former main highway between Szczecin and Loecknitz. This road was still in use, under certain conditions, by vehicles from both East Germany and Poland, primarily by the border police in East Germany and the WOP in Poland;

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This road was always guarded by a two-man post. A main highway paralleled the border on the German side; this was open to civilian traffic, and identification was never checked. The border could be seen very well from this road. Smaller roads were trenched at the border.

- c. South of the Szczecin-Loecknitz road was a railroad line from Szczecin to Grambow, used by repatriation trains and freight trains traveling through East Germany to other countries. The railroad line was always guarded by a two-man post.
- d. The border in the north of the sector was not easily visible. Alarm devices were used for security, which was not done in the southern part.

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- e. This sector of the border was considered critical for illegal border crossing and was accordingly under strict security. The best and most capable border police were assigned to it, although the sector was small. Observation towers were always occupied, and at night five two-man patrols covered the area; one of them always had a dog.
- 8. Grambow Border Control Point (KPP), manned by a company of border police of the Loecknitz Regiment. The command post was just across from the railroad station and was easily seen. The personnel spent the day at the railroad station checking trains coming in from Poland. (See Annex E.)
 - a. Each transport of repatriates had an escort, who carried a list of all passengers. When the train arrived in the control post area, the escort turned over the list to the border police. Loudspeakers in the area informed travelers that they must remain in the train. Three border police guarded the far side of the train so that no one could get off. The remaining guards entered the train with the customs officials and collected exit permits. These they took to the administration building and compared with the list received from the escort. After it was determined that a name was on the list, a transit visa was stamped in the permits, which were returned to the travelers. Meanwhile, customs officials searched the entire train for unauthorized persons and undeclared items. After the inspection was completed, the train was permitted to proceed.
- 9. From the Szczecin-Grambow railroad line to the Szczecin-Berlin Autobahn, controlled by a border police company of the Loecknitz Regiment stationed at Ladenthin.
 - a. The border was completely visible, and the number of illegal border crossers was much smaller than, for example, in the Neu Lienken sector.
 - b. The first road south of the railroad line, called Bobliner Damm, was entrenched at the border so that vehicles could not be taken across. The second road, from Ladenthin to Bedurgowo (Mandelkow) in Poland, called Kirschallee, was also entrenched on the German side to halt vehicular traffic. The next five paths crossing the border were likewise entrenched.
 - c. The Autobahn, which carried freight traffic between Poland and other countries and East Germany, was not guarded on the German side, but there were permanent sentry posts on the Polish side, with two guards on duty day and night.
- 10. From the Szczecin-Berlin Autobahn to the Oder River, controlled by a border police company with headquarters at Rosow; this was the last land

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sector controlled by the Loecknitz Regiment.

- a. The border in this sector was generally quite visible and therefore easy to secure. It was not considered critical, and few illegal crossings there were reported between 1952 and 1958.
- b. The border was secured primarily by observation towers and ground posts, and by patrols. Few alarm devices were used on the German side, except where the border was not visible.
- c. Students at the Storkow border police school, although not usually engaged in operational border duty, might be ordered out to help search if an illegal border crossing occurred in the area.

11. The Oder River, controlled by companies of the Loecknitz Regiment.

- a. Companies along the Oder included:
 - (1) Section II, Oderberg, with headquarters at Guestebiese, Oderberg, Schwedt, and Gartz and a border control point at Gartz.
 - (2) Section I, Kietz, with headquarters at Kietz and Kienitz and two other points.
- b. Border security measures were the same in all sectors. The primary security was by boats, the secondary by patrols and observation towers. Bridges across the Oder were manned 24 hours a day by a double guard. Alarm devices and dogs were not used.

B. German Border Police Organization.

1. The East German border police was organized in brigades with subordinate regiments (Grenzbereitschaften) divided into battalions. The over-all organization for East Germany included the following units:
 - a. Perleberg Brigade.
 - (1) Schoenberg Regiment.
 - (2) Wittenburg Regiment.
 - (3) Grabow Regiment.
 - (4) Wittenberge Regiment.
 - b. Magdeburg Brigade.
 - (1) Salzwedel Regiment.
 - (2) Gardelegen Regiment.
 - (3) Oschersleben Regiment.
 - (4) Marienborn Regiment, KPP.
 - (5) Halberstadt Regiment

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c. Erfurt Brigade.

- (1) Nordhausen Regiment.
- (2) Muehlhausen Regiment.
- (3) Sondershausen Officers' School.
- (4) Eisenach Regiment.
- (5) Meiningen Regiment.
- (6) Hildburghausen Regiment.

d. Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz) Brigade.

- (1) Sonneberg Regiment.
- (2) Plauen Regiment.
- (3) Klingenthal Regiment.
- (4) Pirna Regiment.

e. Rostock Brigade.

- (1) Greifswald Regiment, with battalions at Stralsund, Bergen, Wolgast, and one other place.
- (2) Rostock Regiment.
- (3) Two other regiments.

f. Potsdam Brigade, with two regiments.

g. Frankfurt/Oder Brigade.

- (1) Loecknitz Regiment, with battalions at Loecknitz, Storkow, Oderberg, and Kietz.
- (2) Goerlitz Regiment, with battalions at Frankfurt/Oder, Forst, Weisswasser, and one other place.

h. Border Guard Schools.

- (1) Berlin, drivers' school.
- (2) Doemitzle, NCO school.
- (3) Erfurt, administration school.
- (4) Leipzig, medical technicians' (Feldscher) school.
- (5) Ruegen, radio school.
- (6) Sondershausen, officers' school.
- (7) Tetrow, intelligence school.
- (8) Wittenberg, unidentified school.

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2. A regimental headquarters consisted of the following:

- a. Commander (Kommandeur).
- b. Chief of staff (Stab-chef), responsible for:
 - (1) Border Service (Grenzdienst), planning and cartography, about five men.
 - (2) Communications (Nachrichten), about 12 men.
 - (3) Cryptographic Section (OP-VII).
 - (4) Judge Advocate (Staatsanwalt).
 - (5) Message Center, including couriers and control of classified documents (VS Abteilung und Kurier).
 - (6) Engineer Detachment (Pionierzug), about 20 men.
 - (7) Headquarters Company (Stabskompanie), about 30 men.
 - (8) Enlisted personnel (Mannsch. Kader).
 - (9) Officer personnel (Offz. Kader).
 - (10) Training (Schulung), about five men; this might include weapons training, with one man.
- c. Deputy commander for political and cultural matters (Stellvertreter Polit), responsible for:
 - (1) Party matters (Partei), about two men; another two men might be assigned to Party agitation.
 - (2) Youth matters (Jugendfragen) (FDJ), about two men.
 - (3) Propaganda (Propaganda), about two men.
 - (4) Library (Bibliothek).
 - (5) Political training (Schulung), about 10 men.
- d. Deputy commander for supply (Stellvertreter Versorgung), also called deputy for rear services (Rueckwaertige Dienste), responsible for:
 - (1) Furniture and equipment (Innenausrustung), including weapons and armament, with about three men.
 - (2) Rations (Verpflegung), about 10 men.
 - (3) Uniforms (Bekleidung).
 - (4) Finance (Finanzen), about four men.
 - (5) Medical care (Kranken Revier or Gesundheitswesen), about three men.

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e. In addition, there were:

- (1) MfS Subsection I/6 representatives, usually two, responsible for personnel security in the border police.
- (2) Border police intelligence (Aufklaerung) representatives, usually two.
- (3) Special services, such as the Chemical Service (Chemische Dienste), with one man.

3. A battalion headquarters had the following organization:

a. Commander (Leiter), deputy commander (Stellvertreter), political deputy (Stellvertreter Polit), border guard operations deputy (Stellvertreter fuer Grenzdienst), intelligence aide (Aufklaerungsmitarbeiter) and MfS aide (MfS Mitarbeiter).

b. A guard force (Wache) of 10 men.

4. A border guard company was organized as follows:

a. Commander, deputy commander for operations, deputy commander for political matters, and a company clerk (Innendienst Leiter).

b. Company group leaders (Gruppenfuehrer), five to eight, and 30 to 60 guards (Soldaten).

5. The border police were all well armed, with Soviet Army weapons of World War II types. The normal armament for a company consisted of:

About 40	44 machine pistols)
About 20	44 carbines)
About 5	T-33 pistols)
3	44 light machineguns)
About 10	flare pistols	

According to order No. 100 issued by the East German Minister of Interior, many changes in armament were to be made by 1960.

C. East German Border Police Organization on the Polish Border. (See Annex F)

1. The East German-Polish border was controlled by three border guard regiments: Greifswald, Loecknitz, and Goerlitz. They had each approximately 1200 to 1500 men, organized in battalions of about 300 men and companies of from 40 to 70 men. Regiments on the Western border were smaller, with about 800 men, and therefore each covered a smaller border sector. According to East German Ministry of Interior Directive No. 100, the border police on the eastern border were to be organized by 1960 into a more military structure. In the new organization, each border brigade was to have four regiments, each regiment four battalions, and each battalion four companies. The regiments on the Polish border were to be stationed at Angermuende (or Eberswalde); Cottbus, Forst, or Stalinstadt; Loecknitz; and Goerlitz. No changes were planned for the western border organization.

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2. The Greifswald Regiment had two companies on this border:

- a. At Ahlbeck, on the Baltic opposite Swinoujscie. This company occupied a massive concrete structure somewhat outside the village. Its primary responsibility was the land border between the Haff and the village of Caminke, but it also assisted the adjacent company by observing persons attempting to cross the Baltic illegally. The authorized strength of the company was three officers, an administrative chief, five operational and two administrative NCOs, and 20 chief and 25 ordinary sentries, the latter including two motorcycle riders and two to four dog handlers. The unit was usually up to strength, although there were constant shifts of individual personnel because of leave, illness, or official business. Armament was about the usual amount.
- b. At Caminke. This company was very small. It depended on boats rather than technical devices. Boat crews of three men, armed with one machine pistol, carried on patrols; they were relieved individually by a prearranged schedule.

3. The Loecknitz Regiment controlled an area from the Kalkenbergen almost to Frankfurt/Oder, divided into four sections:

- a. Section I, Kietz, with companies at Kietz and Kienitz.
- b. Section II, Oderberg, with companies at Guestebiese, Oderberg, Schwedt, and Gartz.
- c. Section III, Storkow.
 - (1) Company at Rosow, under a commander, Lt. Fleischer (fnu). Personnel included a deputy for operational and a deputy for political matters, an administrative chief, about four operational and two administrative NCOs, about 15 senior and 15 ordinary sentries, a driver, and about three dog handlers. Armament consisted of five anti-tank weapons, 10 flare pistols, and the following 7.62 calibre weapons: twenty-four 44 machine pistols, fifteen 44 carbines, three light machineguns, and five 33 pistols. Field glasses were used as technical equipment.
 - (2) Company at Ladenthin. The commander was Lt. Kadur (fnu); he had a political and an operational deputy and an administrative chief, with the usual unit composition.
 - (3) The border control point unit (KPP) at Grambow. This unit, which had no border security duties beyond checking trains, was commanded by Sgt. 1/C Sonntag (fnu) and included three NCOs and five privates. Its armament consisted of five machine pistols and five pistols; no other weapons were used in control point units. The unit was composed of selected border police and had very good discipline.
 - (4) The border control point at Gartz.
 - (5) The border police training school at Storkow. This school, located on the Autobahn, gave three-month courses, with an average class of about 150 students, to new men just assigned to the border police. Students were sometimes called out to help

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in searches for illegal border crossers (see above), although normally they did not participate in operational border duty. The trainees made it difficult for an illegal border crossing to succeed because they were always eager and alert and did not sleep on duty.

d. Section IV, Loecknitz

- (1) Company at Neu Lienken. The commander was Senior Lt. Otto Schmidtke, his political deputy Lt. Karsten (fnu). Other personnel were an operational deputy, an administrative chief; five operational and two administrative NCOs; about 20 senior and 25 ordinary sentries; two drivers; and four dog handlers. Discipline was good, with no punishments for infractions and no sleeping on post. The best and most capable border police were assigned to this company. Armament included 7.62 calibre weapons: about thirty 44 machine pistols, thirty 44 carbines, three 44 light machineguns, and five 33 pistols; 10 flare pistols, and five light anti-tank weapons. Technical equipment consisted of about 10 pairs of field glasses, five company telephones, and 10 telephone receivers at individual border posts.
- (2) Company at Blankensee. The commander was Lt. Jawoscheck (fnu); his political deputy was Lt. Schade (fnu) and his operational deputy Lt. Braun (fnu). The company included an administrative chief; four operational and two administrative NCOs, about 15 senior and 15 ordinary sentries, two drivers, and four dog handlers. Discipline in this company was almost the poorest in the regiment; much drinking went on, unit members were insubordinate, and sentries were frequently reported asleep at their posts. There were also many instances of fighting with civilians in the villages. The company was armed with about 20 machine pistols, fifteen 44 carbines, five 33 pistols, and three 44 machineguns, all of 7.62 calibre; five light anti-tank weapons; and 10 flare pistols.
- (3) Company at Pampow. The commander was Lt. Rudi Stutzke; other personnel were a political and an operational deputy, both lieutenants; an administrative chief; four operational and two administrative NCOs; about 30 sentries, half chief and half ordinary; a driver; two dog handlers; and two women cooks, civilian employees subordinate to the administrative chief. Discipline was good, thanks to the company commander. Very few punishments had to be imposed; sentries did not sleep at their posts; there was no drunkenness or fighting; and the police could not be bribed.
- (4) Company at Hintersee. The company was commanded by Senior Lt. Heinz Wendler. Other personnel were a deputy for political matters; a deputy for operational matters, Junior Lt. Schmidt (fnu); five operational and two administrative NCOs; about 20 chief and 25 ordinary sentries; one driver; and three dog handlers. Some of the company were always on leave, sick, or under arrest. Discipline was very poor, since all border police who committed offenses in any of the other companies were transferred into this one. It had the largest number of cases of sleeping on post, fighting, and drinking. Poaching was very prevalent in the company's sector, since most of the police were

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corrupt and would take bribes. The number of good men in the company was too small to be considered. The company's armament consisted of machine pistols, carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare guns, light machineguns, and light anti-tank weapons.

(5) The company at Rieth. This company, commanded by Lt. Bahnke (fmu), included a deputy for political matters, an administrative chief, five operational and two administrative NCOs, and about 20 chief and 20 ordinary sentries, including drivers and dog handlers. Company discipline was very good, thanks to the commander. Armament was normal.

4. The border police was responsible for cooperation with the appropriate agencies in their border sectors.

a. Agencies with which relations were maintained included:

(1) The People's Police (Volkspolizei): District (Bezirk) and Kreis officials, stations, and sector representatives.

(2) The State Security Service (MfS): District administration, principally I/6, HA II, Section XII, and Section XIII; Kreis offices, particularly Section II 5.

(3) The SED: District and Kreis offices and individual factory groups.

(4) The FDJ: District and Kreis offices.

(5) Government offices: The District and Kreis Councils.

(6) The National Front, to a limited extent.

(7) The National People's Army: Local agencies and offices.

(8) The Soviet Army: Agencies in the area.

b. So-called "security conferences" were held once a month with the SED. These were at two levels, district and Kreis.

(1) District conferences included the commander and deputy commander for political matters of the Border Police Regiment and the chief of the Border Police Intelligence Section; the district Party secretary and security section chief; the MfS district administrative chief; the district People's Police chief; and the chief of Section K of the district authority. When matters concerning Poland were to be discussed, the proper representative from Poland was invited; this would normally be the chief of the appropriate WOP border brigade. If matters concerning the Soviet Army were discussed, the highest ranking local Soviet military representative attended. At these conferences, all matters affecting the security of the district in any manner which had occurred in the previous month were discussed: defections to the West, espionage cases, sabotage cases, and possible diversionary acts; major investigations of the People's Police; details of illegal border crossing questions; and border police matters such as offices, morale, provision of technical aids, and employment of new policemen. These conferences

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usually began in the morning and ended in the evening, lasting about 20 hours. There was no fixed schedule; the next meeting was set each time by the participants.

(2) Kreis security conferences were held monthly, but not on a fixed date. They were attended by the chief and political deputy of the border police section and the responsible case officer of the Intelligence Section; the Chief of the MfS Kreis office; the Kreis Party secretary; the chief of the Kreis People's Police office and the chief of his K Section. The same matters at Kreis level as those discussed in the district conference formed the agenda, except that matters concerning Poland and the Soviet Army were not discussed at Kreis level.

c. In case of alerts of Condition I or Condition II, previously designated liaison officers were sent by the Border Police Regiment to the individual People's Police offices to support them. Aid was given in every conceivable form, including personnel and vehicles. The liaison officers were also empowered to use the trained search groups for the People's Police. Border police companies maintained their own liaison with local representatives of the People's Police.

Polish Border Security

A. Polish Border Sectors

The East German-Polish border had three critical points for illegal border crossings: the area west of Szczecin, the highway and railroad control points at Frankfurt/Oder, and a short stretch of land border between the Oder and Neisse Rivers. The border was divided into the following sectors:

1. The Haff and the Neuwarper See, controlled by the Neuwarper WOP company, with headquarters in the Polish side of Neuwarper (Nowe Warpno).
 - a. The Polish shore of the Haff and the Neuwarper See had a plowed strip 10 meters wide; there was no fence. Technical devices were apparently used to protect the border, and there were observation towers and boats. This sector was considered particularly sensitive because of the army installations in Szczecin.
 - b. A restricted area ran about five or six kilometers back from the border; strangers required a special pass to enter. This area was called the second security belt. All roads were closed off and guarded by sentries. Persons living or working in the restricted area had permanent passes, permitting them to enter it at any time; they were valid only for six months and had to be renewed at the appropriate WOP office. Persons from other parts of Poland wishing to visit relatives in this area had to apply to the militia office at their place of residence, submitting with the application an approval from the mayor of the place they wished to visit, certifying that the community had no objection to the visit. Special passes for such visitors were issued with a specific date of expiration. The holder had to report personally to the local WOP office on arrival at his destination and on departure.
 - c. The Haff and the Neuwarper See were closed to tourists and no special passes were issued for the area. Individual boat landings of the Polish fishermen were guarded day and night by WOP personnel. Fishermen were

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allowed on the water only from sunrise to sunset and, when they went out in a boat, must leave their papers with the WOP sentries, in exchange for a pass authorizing them to move about on the water. If a fisherman did not turn in his identity document and was later checked by a WOP water patrol, his fishing license was withdrawn and he was barred for fishing for some time. If he was not on good terms with the authorities and was known to oppose the Polish government, his license was revoked.

- d. Each community near the border contained a large number of recruited sources working for intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. These individuals had the mission of watching visitors.
- 2. From the Neuwarper See to and through the Gross Muetzelburger See, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Mysliborz Maly (Klein Muetzelburg).
 - a. The communities of Mysliborz Maly and Mysliborz Wielki (Gross Muetzelburg) were inhabited by civilians, mostly woodcutters. Some fishermen fished in the Klein Muetzelburger See; fishing in the Gross Muetzelburger See was forbidden on the Polish side. The forest house in Mysliborz Wielki was manned by Germans, who said very little about themselves and gave the impression they were recruited sources of Polish intelligence agencies. The chief forester was a German who formerly belonged to the Nazi Party but had currently no party affiliation.
 - b. Part of the border was formed by the Beeck, a stream with an average width of about two meters and a depth of from one half to one meter. In normal seasons, a reasonably practiced jumper could leap the stream without difficulty. When a strong north wind rose in the Baltic, however, the Beeck became full of water and the surrounding meadows were completely flooded; under such circumstances, it would be difficult for an illegal border crosser to get through.
 - c. In the northern part of the sector there was a railroad embankment from which the line had been removed. At the border, the embankment led to a bridge, which was under continuous guard by a hidden German border policeman; on the Polish side the embankment was guarded only at the second security belt, with no sentries actually on the border. Farther south, the road which formerly ran between Mysliborz Maly and Rieth, also on an embankment with a bridge across the Beeck, was guarded at the bridge by Polish sentries, but there were no guard posts directly at the bridge on the German side.
 - d. The northern part of the sector border ran through meadowland. The southern part ran through a thick deciduous forest, where the trees were close together and there was a heavy growth of underbrush. Although illegal border crossers could arrive at the border unseen, there was a 10-meter plowed strip, where trees and underbrush had been removed. In the northern part, an embankment on a solid base through the swampy parts of the land carried the plowed strip, which consisted of sand about 30 centimeters deep, regularly raked over by hand. The strip was in excellent condition and unusually well cared for. The border fence was two and a half meters high and Y-shaped. It was not certain whether the fence in this sector had been reduced in height. Visual and acoustic signal devices were also used.

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- e. No visitors were allowed in this area; residents of Mysliborz Maly and Mysliborz Wielki could visit relatives outside the area but could not receive return visits. Persons leaving the area had to report to WOP authorities.
- f. In both communities there were opportunities for illegal border crossers to hide in collapsed houses and barns, where they were not easily detected. Security in this area was very lax, as was learned from illegal border crossers apprehended in East Germany.

3. The Stolec sector, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Stolec (Stolzenburg).

- a. The only water border in this area was the Stolzenburger See, near the town. The 10-meter plowed strip, in very good condition, ran around the Polish side of the lake. Fishing in this lake was prohibited by both Germans and Poles, except that once a month permission was granted one fisherman from Blankensee to fish under the supervision of a German border policeman.
- b. A dismantled railroad line connecting Poland and East Germany ran south of Stolec. This and the road which ran close to it were torn up on both sides of the border.
- c. The first Polish security belt extended 300 meters from the border, which was marked with stakes and followed by a Y-shaped fence two and a half meters high. The fence was supposed to be reduced to a meter and a half, but this had not been done by May 1958. Beyond the fence was a continuous line of alarm devices, such as tripwires, which were interconnected and fired a flare when triggered. Three tripwires were placed at approximately two-meter intervals between the fence and the 10-meter strip. The strip was well cared for and closely checked. The first belt ended with a series of observation towers and tree platforms.
- d. The second security belt was at the fringe of the restricted area, about five kilometers from the border. Sentry assignment varied; it was coordinated each month by the German and Polish border commands. Visitors were not allowed in the restricted area; residents could go out to visit relatives but could receive visits only from area residents who had special passes. Visits of residents within the area did not have to be reported to the WOP.
- e. The sector was not considered critical for illegal border crossing; between 1952 and 1958, only two illegal border crossings were known to have occurred there, and one of the crossers was apprehended in East Germany. In the area north of the Stolzenburger See, however, the forest was so thick and full of undergrowth that the Polish sentries could not secure it completely.

4. The Blankensee sector, controlled by a WOP company at Rzedziny (Nassenheide).

- a. The border ran through the Pampower See, which was almost completely dried up and was overgrown with reeds. From there it ran through a meadow, very wet but never flooded.
- b. The border was marked by stakes, with a meter-and-a-half high fence beyond them. Beyond the fence were alarm devices: three tripwires,

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installed about 30 centimeters above the surface of the ground, at intervals of about two meters; each released an alarm independently. Beyond the tripwires was the plowed strip, about eight meters wide in this sector, over sandy terrain and in very good condition. It was not known whether there were further alarm devices beyond the strip.

- c. Observation towers, observation posts, and patrols were used. In the first security belt, observation towers were manned only during the day. At night sentries manned hidden observation and listening posts, which were frequently moved, and there were patrols. The second security belt, about five kilometers from the border, marked a restricted area. All roads leading into it were guarded by permanent sentry posts.
- d. In the southern part of the sector, near Boelninghof, there were tall masts with lights which went on when a knee-high tripwire between the masts was broken. This system ran south continuously to a point opposite Ladenthin on the German side.
- e. The road that crossed the border from north to south near Blankensee was dug up on both sides of the border to close it to vehicular traffic. A road parallel to the border on the Polish side was open to traffic if the driver had a special pass.
- f. This sector was not considered critical for illegal crossings and security was not strongly emphasized. Guard discipline was not good, and there was extensive illegal dealing with German border police.

5. Daber sector, to the Neu Lienken-Alt Lienken road, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Daber.

- a. The 10-meter plowed strip in this sector was not in particularly good condition because the soil was poor. The border ran through a wooded area.
- b. Many communities in this area issued permits for visitors from outside the restricted area. Many agricultural workers who were employed in this sector lived in or near Szczecin and held special permanent area passes.
- c. The Neu Lienken-Alt Lienken road was torn up on both sides of the border so that it was closed to vehicular traffic.
- d. This sector was considered critical for illegal border crossing, and security was strict. Persons who came to Szczecin seeking a way out of Poland usually made their attempts in this sector.

6. From the Alt Lienken-Neu Lienken road to Szczecin-Grambow railroad line, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Doluge (Neuenkirchen).

- a. The border in this sector ran through mostly dry terrain but with a few wet areas. Since the sector was considered critical, security measures were very well organized.
- b. The border in this sector was indicated by stakes, numbered from south to north in an 800 series. Beyond the stakes was the Y-shaped

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fence, two and a half meters high, and not scheduled to be made lower. Beyond that was the 10-meter plowed strip, kept in excellent condition and checked every half hour by a patrol, accompanied by a responsible officer. Beyond it were three tripwires, about two meters apart, operating independently of one another. Beyond that was a line of masts at 80-meter intervals. A thick evergreen forest began about 400 meters from the border on the Polish side. Just in front of it was a line of observation towers (but no observation posts in the trees), manned from dawn to dark; patrols operated between them at night.

- c. The Szczecin-Loecknitz road crossed the border in this sector. The 10-meter plowed strip, not equipped with alarm devices, crossed the road. Sentries were permanently on duty at the border crossing point and immediately re-raked the strip after a vehicle had passed. On the German side were two movable barriers, always locked; the key was held by the sentry posted at the nearest observation tower. On the Polish side was an unlocked and unguarded barrier, which a traveler raised for himself, on the border edge of the 10-meter plowed strip. About 200 meters inland from the first barrier was another, at the entrance of the road to Daber. All vehicles traveling to Daber and beyond were checked by the guards at this barrier to see that drivers had the necessary papers for the restricted area. On the south side of the road was a small stone guardhouse, normally manned by two soldiers and an officer. The latter was responsible for control of the 10-meter strip and issuance of permission to proceed to persons with valid permits. This officer normally spoke more than one language, since the road was the legal crossing point for German security agency officials with valid border permits and Western consular and diplomatic representatives. Farther along the road, just outside Doluje, was another WOP guard-post where both through travelers and persons entering and leaving the restricted area were checked.
- d. The Szczecin-Grambow railroad line ran through an area covered with bushes about two meters high. A railroad workers' hut stood about 400 meters from the border. A two-meter high superstructure of glass had been added to this hut, from which sentries on duty could observe the entire surrounding terrain. A very strong movable searchlight, which burned all night, installed here, permitted guards to check the surrounding area for about 600 meters. From the Grambow railroad station almost to the Stobno (Stoeven) station were lights on masts on each side of the railroad embankment; they burned all night, illuminating the embankment with daylight intensity. A second railroad workers' hut stood on the eastern edge of Stobno; it was modified like the other but did not have a searchlight. Three sentries, one of whom remained outside at all times, were on duty at each of these huts. Another sentry was on duty all night at the point where the 10-meter strip crossed the railroad, and a pair of sentries patrolled the railroad embankment day and night between the border and the Stobno railroad station.
- e. The second security belt was more heavily manned than the first or the border itself. Its limit was beyond the village of Doluje. The extra strength was intended to relieve the burden on the border guards in this area of many illegal border crossing attempts.
- f. The restricted area received from outside many workers, who had permanent passes, and residents were allowed to receive visits at any

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time from relatives who had obtained the necessary permits. Additional checkpoints for entry and exit at Wolczkowo (Voelschen-dorf) and Stobno had border troops who checked all permits, including those of laborers employed in the area.

7. From the Szczecin-Berlin railroad line to the village of Barnislaw (Barnimslow), controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Bedargowo (Mandelkow).
 - a. The border was marked by a line of stakes; beyond it was a fence a meter and a half high, beginning at the railroad line. Beyond that were three tripwires, operating independently, and beyond them the 10-meter plowed strip, which was here in very good condition because the soil was sandy; even in wet weather the soil was spongy enough to retain footprints. Beyond the strip were lights on masts; they lighted when the tripwire was disturbed. Just beyond them was the first security belt, made up of observation towers, used for daytime control; not all towers were occupied. The area was patrolled at night, the routes changing every 24 hours.
 - b. The second security belt was beyond the villages of Smolecin (Schmellentin) and Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).
 - c. Individual paths and roads crossing the border in this sector were torn up and not open to vehicular traffic.
 - d. Villages in this sector were open to visitors who had valid entry permits. Anyone entering the area without a permit was considered to be trying to cross the border illegally and was punished under the appropriate laws.
 - e. This sector was not considered a critical security area, since the border was easy to observe. From 1952 to 1958, only five illegal border crossings were known to have occurred in the area between the railroad line and the Autobahn, and all the crossers were captured. The possibility was not excluded that individuals might have crossed undetected.
8. From the Barnislaw road to the Oder River, controlled by a WOP company with headquarters at Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).
 - a. The border in this area was easily observable, with a sandy terrain. All roads except the Autobahn were torn up on both sides of the border to deny passage to vehicles. The Autobahn was guarded by two sentries day and night. The railroad line was also dismantled, but only on the Polish side.
 - b. The border was marked with stakes, then a meter-and-a-half high fence, then three independently operating tripwires. Beyond these was the plowed strip, 10 meters wide and in good condition because of the sandy soil. On the far side of the strip was a line of alarm lights on wooden masts, but these had been poorly installed and did not function well. Observation towers, beyond that, were of standard types.
9. Along the Oder, controlled by a WOP company, with headquarters at Gryfino (Greifenhagen).
 - a. There was no fence on the Polish side of the Oder, but the plowed strip ran along the bank and was well kept up. The border was secured during the day by observation towers and at night by both

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stationary and patrolling boats. Dogs were not kept, since they were of little use in the river sectors.

- b. Outsiders were allowed to visit communities in this area if they had valid permits; they had to report in and out in the villages visited. Issuance of passes to this area was not as strictly controlled as in some others; a person indicating a desire to find work in the area could obtain a pass without difficulty.
- c. Polish fishermen were not allowed to fish in the Oder. The Polish government forbade them because of the large amount of smuggling carried on between Polish and German fishermen.
- d. This sector was typical of all the Oder boundary sectors. On the river, sectors averaged about 10 kilometers, somewhat longer than the normal land sector.

B. The Polish Border Forces. (See Annex G.)

- 1. Polish border forces were under the Ministry of Defense, which was under the influence of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR). An office within the ministry was responsible for border security. The Polish border troops (WOP - Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza - Frontier Defense Forces) were organized in border brigades of about 1400 men each, divided into four to six battalions, having in turn four to six companies (Kommando) of three officers and 40 to 50 men each. A brigade headquarters had about 300 men, a battalion headquarters about 60 men. There was also an Intelligence Section, subordinate to the individual unit chiefs. Counter-intelligence activities in WOP units were carried on by the Counter-intelligence Section of the Militia; the individual unit chiefs had no jurisdiction over counterintelligence agents. Battalions controlled the deployment of sentry posts, patrols, alarm devices, and organizational sub-units, and company commanders were subordinate to them in all matters.
- 2. Two WOP brigades, totaling about 3000 men, controlled the Polish-East German border. The Szczecin Brigade controlled the area from the Baltic to Frankfurt/Oder, the Frankfurt/Oder Brigade the territory from there to Zittau on the Czech border.
- 3. The Szczecin Brigade had several battalions and the following units:
 - a. Stolec Battalion, with headquarters at Stolec (Stolzenburg). This battalion had six companies subordinate to it. Its headquarters personnel consisted of a commander, a political deputy, a border service officer, three control officers (inspectors), a counterintelligence officer, about five NCOs, about eight enlisted men, three drivers, and a tracking dog handler. Its arms included TT-33 pistols, machine pistols, and flare guns.
 - (1) Company at Nowe Warpno (Neuwarp).
This company had quarters in the middle of the town. It consisted of a commander, a deputy for political and a deputy for operational matters, an administrative chief, five to eight NCOs, about 40 to 50 enlisted men, and about five guard dogs.

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(2) Company at Mysliborz Maly (Klein Muetzelburg).

This company consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, five to eight NCOs, 40 to 50 enlisted men, and three to five guard dogs. It was armed with 44 carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare pistols, and Polish-manufactured machine pistols. Discipline in this company was not very good.

(3) Company at Stolec.

The company consisted of a commander, a political and operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs, 40 to 50 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and two drivers. It was armed with 44 carbines, TT-33 pistols, flare pistols, and Polish-made machine pistols. It had two motor-cycles with sidecars.

(4) Company at Rzedziny (Nassenheide).

This consisted of a commander, a deputy for political and for operational matters, an administrative chief, about five NCOs, about 30 enlisted men, one driver, and about five dog handlers. Discipline in this unit was lax. Sentries were frequently absent from their posts or slept on duty. The men were corrupt and had many illegal dealings with the German border police opposite, exchanging geese and ammunition for clothing and other items.

(5) Company at Daber.

This company consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, about five NCOs, about 30 to 40 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and a driver. Discipline in the unit was very good; no soldiers were punished for guard duty infractions.

(6) Company at Doluje (Neuenkirchen).

This company consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs, about 40 to 50 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and two drivers. It was armed with carbines, machine pistols, pistols, and flare pistols. Under this company were two subunits:

(a) At Wolczkowo (Voelschendorf), with a commander, a deputy, a control officer, about three NCOs, about 10 enlisted men, and a driver. Weapons were the same as for the company; there were no dogs.

(b) At Stobno (Stoeven), with the same composition and weapons.

b. The Oder Battalion, with headquarters at Gryfino (Greifenhagen).

(1) Company at Bedargowo (Mandolkow).

This company consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, about five NCOs,

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about 30 to 40 enlisted men, a driver, and about five dog handlers. It was armed with 44 carbines, machine pistols, pistols and flare pistols.

(2) Company at Kolbaskowo (Kolbitzow).

This company consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs, about 30 to 40 enlisted men, about five dog handlers, and a driver. There may have been sub-units under this company.

(3) Company at Gryfino (Greifenhagen).

This company, one of the Oder River units, consisted of a commander, a political and an operational deputy, an administrative chief, about eight NCOs, about 30 to 40 enlisted men, and two drivers. Weapons were the same as those in the other units. Some patrol boats were armed with a light machinegun mounted on deck. There were no dog handlers, since dogs were not very useful along the river.

- c. The Swinoujscie (Swinemuende) Battalion.
- d. The Kolobrzeg (Kolberg) Battalion.
- e. The Ognica (Nipperwiese) Battalion.
- f. The Kostrzyn (Kuestrin) Battalion.
- g. The Frankfurt/Oder Battalion.

Border Control Techniques and Problems

A. Fences.

1. No fences were used on the German side of the border. The Polish side, however, except in some of the water border areas, and across the main railroads, had a continuous Y-shaped fence two and a half meters high.
2. At the beginning of 1957, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party ordered the Polish border brigades to cut down the high fences along the border with East Germany to a height of 1.50 meters. The fence posts were to be sawed off and the raw tops were to be treated with wood preservatives. Commanders of individual units were left to determine where the fence should be reduced in height and where preserved. After a conference of the East German border police from Loecknitz and the Polish border guards from Szczecin, it was decided in the first half of 1958 not to tear out the fence in the Neu Lienken sector (from Daber to Grambow) since the greatest number of illegal border crossings had occurred there. In all other sectors, the fence was to be cut down to the new height during 1958. There was a popular semi-official belief in East Germany that the reduction of the height of the fence was aimed at destroying the idea of an "Iron Curtain" between two "people's republics," although the curtain continued to exist.

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B. Dogs.

Both Germans and Poles used two types of dogs: guard dogs and trackers. Each dog had his own handler, who was completely responsible for the animal in all matters; the number of dogs and dog handlers in a unit was always equal. On the German side, both dogs and handlers were trained at the Central Dog School of the border police unit at Bautzen. In the Loecknitz area, all dogs used were German shepherds. Dogs never performed more than eight to twelve hours' duty a day.

1. Guard dogs.

These dogs, which were unable to follow tracks by scent and were only for the protection of sentries, were assigned at about the rate of four per company of border police. On order, they would attack a man by springing at him from the front, grip the clothing on his chest, and throw him to the ground, where they would hold him until a release signal was given by the dog handler. In most cases, dogs would not attack a man in uniform because they were beaten for this. Use of dogs in the company was planned by the company staff. All dogs in the company might be used during the day or all at night, depending on the decision of the company commander.

2. Tracking dogs.

These dogs were kept with the regimental staff or at an appropriate border division, being assigned normally three to a regiment. When an illegal border crossing was reported, the dog and his handler were taken by vehicle to the spot. Tracking dogs could usually follow a scent up to eight kilometers. Standard procedure for the use of tracking dogs would follow approximately this schedule:

- a. An illegal border crossing was discovered on the Polish side at 2200 hours and the tracks preserved if possible. The next higher headquarters was notified at 2210 hours and the German border police by 2215 hours. The German dog handler was waked by the duty officer at 2220 and a vehicle was dispatched for him at 2230 hours.
- b. Both Polish and German dog handlers arrived with their dogs at the crossing point about 2250 hours. Permission was immediately granted for the Polish handler to search for the crosser on German soil. The fence was cut (unless it was so low as to make this unnecessary) so that the dog and handler could enter East Germany uninjured.
- c. The Polish handler, armed with a pistol, went through the fence first, leaving the dog, on a 20-meter line, on the 10-meter plowed strip. His assistant in Poland set the dog on the scent, and the dog then came through the fence. Polish dog handlers always had to be accompanied while in Germany by a German officer and an NCO. During the pursuit the dog was kept on the line.
- d. When the Polish dog had run itself out, the first German dog took over and the succession continued until the crosser was apprehended. If the border crosser was picked up by a vehicle or rode off on a bicycle, the dogs were called off and the Berlin Ring was immediately sealed off.
- e. After the pursuit of a crosser was completed, the fence was repaired by engineers from the Polish border troops.

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C. Pursuit of Border Crossers

1. Border police activity following an illegal border crossing may be illustrated by the following example:

a. Polish side.

At 2200 hours, it was determined that a set of distinct tracks existed across the plowed strip at border marker number 0. The tracks were protected. At 2210 hours, the successful border crossing was reported to the next higher headquarters. At 2215 hours, the WOP Brigade reported the crossing to the duty officer of the East German border police office responsible for the sector.

b. German side.

By 2200 hours, the operational border police duty officer had informed the proper official in the Intelligence Section, who came by car to the crossing point, a trip usually requiring about 30 minutes. Between 2220 and 2240 hours, the operational duty officer gave the alarm within the unit and notified the unit staff of the measures that had been taken. He established a special staff, which was responsible for all subsequent handling of the crossing incident. From the border, the Intelligence Section official telephoned the border police office and informed the special staff that the alarm was valid and the forces assembled could be put into action and gave the estimated direction of the flight. An average of 500 men was put in motion to cordon off the border and search the area in East Germany.

c. Joint effort.

By 2250 hours, the Polish and German tracking dogs were at the border and a tracking search got under way as described above. By 2330, the German special staff had completed the deployment of its forces; all important through roads, paths, and bridges had been occupied up to 10 to 15 kilometers from the border. By 2330 hours, the special staff informed the appropriate Kreis or People's Police offices and the Transport Police of the border crossing. By 2350 hours, the People's Police Kreis office had manned all streets in the main town of the area and was stopping all vehicles for inspection. The Transport Police had manned all the railroad stations, and all trains to Berlin were inspected.

d. Follow-up.

If by 1500 hours the following afternoon the border crosser had not been found, the special staff notified the Berlin Ring of the crossing; the Ring was strengthened and all controls were more strictly enforced. The alarm might last up to 14 days but did not usually last more than 20 hours; by this time the illegal border crosser was usually in custody.

2. When a member of the Soviet Army defected, the procedure was as follows:

a. Sealing off of the Berlin Ring by units of the Soviet Army, the East German border police and People's Police, and the National People's Army; the forces necessary for this were supplied by units in the vicinity of Berlin.

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- b. Employment of Soviet Army patrols and transport police on all trains in East Germany.
- c. Sealing off of the West German border by the border police on an alert basis, with personnel on 12-hour shifts. Border police checked all persons appearing at railroad stations in the border area for identification and checked special passes for restricted border areas.
- d. Dispatch of photographs and description of the defector to the border police and all units engaged in the search.
- e. As dictated by circumstances, notification of the mayors of appropriate communities to participate in the search.
- f. Use of patrols and closing off of the area in which the defector was reported by the civilian population. In most cases, this was done with all locally available units.
- g. Employment of criminal police search groups and issuance of a country-wide search request by teletype.
- h. Reporting to higher headquarters of the defection of a member of the Soviet Army, with an exact account of the measures taken.

3. Search Procedures of the German Border Police.

- a. Along the western border of East Germany, a card index file of "wanted" persons was maintained and supplemented monthly. Search orders were collected by the Main Administration of the People's Police in Berlin and worked over. Index cards were then sent to the individual departments. The cards were marked with a numbering system indicating the approximate length of sentence the wanted person could expect:
 - (1) Period (Laufzeit) 0: Inquiry about residence, person might continue his travel.
 - (2) Period I: Prison sentence up to five years.
 - (3) Period II: Prison, of milder or severer type (Gefaengnis or Zuchthaus), up to 10 years.
 - (4) Period III: Life imprisonment or death sentence.

All travelers entering East Germany were checked against the card index file. Any traveler whose name appeared in the list was detained provisionally by the search department authorities (Fahndungsbevollmaechtigten) until his arrest was legalized by a judge.

- b. The border police also used the People's Police "search books" (Fahndungsbuecher), containing the names of "wanted" persons. These books were handled in the same way as the card index file but were supplemented quarterly or yearly instead of monthly.
- c. Employees of the Intelligence Department (Aufklaerungsabteilung) and of the I/6 of the individual border units still used the "wanted" books of the State Security Service. These books listed only persons "wanted" by Department XII of the MfS, in most cases former employees who had

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deserted or agents who had gone to work for the other side. These persons were not under the jurisdiction of the People's Police and had to be transferred immediately to the next higher department. The People's Police were not aware of the State Security Service "wanted" list.

4. The Plowed Strip.

Along the entire Polish side of the border from the Baltic to Zittau ran a plowed strip eight to ten meters wide, which played a very important part in detection of illegal border crossers. Keeping up the strip was the responsibility of the WOP unit commander in each sector. It was patrolled every half hour. In winter, the Polish guards used a continuous path along the strip, which was not marked with snow stakes; any tracks crossing the path were noted, the alarm sounded, and the rear area was closed off. This procedure was followed in case of any disturbance of the plowed strip, including animal tracks.

- a. The strip was mostly kept in very good condition. It was plowed and harrowed to a depth of about 30 centimeters, and, as soon as it was noticed that the soil was becoming firm at any point, the strip there was dug up and reprocessed. To prevent the growth of weeds, the strip was so thoroughly treated with weedkiller that nothing would grow on it.
- b. In sections such as marshy ground where it was impossible to install the strip in the normal manner, a solid wood base was laid down and spread with fine sand about 20 centimeters thick. Dips or depressions in the strip were eradicated for the most part; where they remained, the strip was still so spongy that it absorbed all the water falling in rainy weather.

5. Border Control Posts.

Border control posts did not carry out sentry or patrol duties but were concerned only with the following:

- a. Checking travelers and railroad crews for valid travel documents.
- b. Issuing entrance, exit, and transit visas for travelers.
- c. Searching for wanted persons when necessary.
- d. On the border between East and West Germany, in addition, checking travelers for identification and against wanted lists; processing all persons requesting residence in East Germany; inspecting trains for persons seeking to travel illegally into, out of, or through East Germany.
- e. Customs personnel stationed at the control posts checked travelers' currency and baggage and supervised freight traffic, with responsibility for seeing that seals on freight cars were not broken and that freight was in good condition.

D. Border Crossing Comments:

1. Statistics.

- a. East German statistics for 1956-1958 in the Loecknitz area showed:

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(1) 16 October to 31 December 1957, 30 persons crossing illegally from east to west, all but one of whom were picked up on the German side, and about five crossers from west to east, of whom three were returned to East Germany, since no agent activity was proved against them, and two remained in Poland.

(2) During 1957, about 150 crossers from east to west, of whom all but two were picked up in East Germany

25X1

From west to east, there were 15 crossers, of whom 10 were returned to East Germany and the rest stayed in Poland.

(3) From 1 January to 20 May 1958, about 30 crossers from east to west, of whom all were picked up, and from west to east about 10 crossers, of whom only two were returned to East Germany and the rest stayed in Poland.

b. Polish border police of the Szczecin Brigade claimed some 300 arrests of attempted border crossers in their area in one month. This appeared to be the average monthly figure in the months of greatest activity (March to September).


c.

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2. Polish Legal Travel Provisions.


1. The only legal exit point for Polish travelers with valid regular passports going from Poland to East Germany was Frankfurt/Oder, whether travel was by train or car. Control on the Polish side of the border was limited to a check by border officials, involving registration of the traveler and stamping of an exit visa in his passport. The traveler was asked whether he was carrying any currency and whether it had been registered, and whether he had any items liable to customs duties. Repatriates were checked against a master list which included passport numbers. Any traveler who aroused suspicion was given a baggage search, and any traveler on a repatriation train in excess of the listed number was not permitted to proceed.
2. The Polish government issued diplomatic and regular passports. The former were limited to personnel directly assigned to a Polish government establishment abroad. Holders of diplomatic passports could choose their own exit points from Poland, but diplomatic passports were registered at all crossing points. Regular passports were easy to acquire for anyone who had the necessary funds. On applying for a passport, the traveler had to deposit the money for a round trip with the travel agency handling formalities.

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





ANNEX B
THE EAST GERMAN-
POLISH BORDER
Example of border
security arrange-
ments and devices


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ANNEX C








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Annex F
Organization of the WOP

